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Credit Participation and
Credit Source Selection of
Vietnam Small and Medium
Enterprises

Abstract

Nguyen Anh Hoang

Toshitsugu Otake

Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Japan
hoanng12@apu.ac.jp

Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Japan
totake@apu.ac.jp

This study is an attempt to investigate the motivation behind the decision to participate in the
credit market of SMEs from perspectives of behavioral finance and social capital theories. In addition, the study also examines the effect of behavioral finance and social capital factors on the credit
source selection among SMEs. This study’s design strategy involves conducting questionnaire surveys to SMEs owners and statistical techniques to analyze the determinants of credit participation
and credit source selection of borrowers. The findings showed that personal traits of SMEs owners/
managers in terms of behavioral finance factors such as debt and risk attitudes, present biased and
overconfidence and firms networking also have impacts on the firms’ credit participation and credit
source selection. The research is one of the few studies that consider the influence of behavioral
finance factors on firms financing decision. Furthermore, our result also contributes to explain the
common use of informal credit market in developing countries.
Keywords: behavioral finance, credit participation, credit source selection, formal
credit, informal credit.

M

ost SMEs in the world face
challenge in finding financing resources. Multiple
studies in developed countries indicated that SMEs are high-risk borrowers (Nguyen et al., 2006; Sogorb-Mira,
2005) and providing the financial resources for SMEs is considered a great
obstacle compared with large firms.
SMEs in emerging economies suffer
more hindrances in finance access because of the underdevelopment of financial institutions and infrastructure,
poor property rights protection and
serious information asymmetry issues.
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SME’s debt financing is a classic theme
gaining attention by numerous scholars. Whereas many empirical studies
of SME financing decision have assumed implicitly that the ultimate goal
of SMEs is to maximize profits, other
researchers have argued that the goal
of independence and control is much
preferred by SME owners. With the
objective of profit maximization, there
is a common sense that SMEs also pursue growth and inquire about external
finance sources (Sogorb-Mira, 2005).
With this assumption, traditional theories of capital structure such as trade-
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off theory and pecking order theory
can help to explain some parts of SME
financing decisions. However, the traditional approaches could not help to
explain the circumstance of ‘debt-adverse’ among SMEs. In other words,
these theories could not explain why
many SMEs do not participate in the
credit market even though they have
a demand of growth and borrowing.
Discouraged borrowers are often ignored from these traditional theories.

ant may initiate more merger and acquisition projects and, therefore, may
pursue heightened leverage policies
(Grable and Lytton, 2003). Especially,
many studies on consumer borrowing
and microfinance investigated the impact of behavioral finance factors such
as present-biased preference or impatience, risk-attitude and debt-attitude
on borrowing decisions of individuals (Bauer et al., 2012; Laibson et al.,
2007; Brown et al., 2013).

On the other hand, a small number
of researchers investigated the relationship between non-financial motivations and corporate financing
decisions. Several theories and assumptions were proposed to explain
the debt aversion or borrowing discourage phenomenon among business,
especially the SME sector (Cressy,
1995; Rice and Strahan, 2010). One
of these theories is the theory of social
capital or firm networks. According to
this theory, networks could give SMEs
an advantage in order to access a bank
loan by increasing the firms’ legitimacy (Le and Nguyen, 2009; Nguyen and
Ramachandran, 2006; Ravina, 2012;
Moro and Fink 2013) or help SMEs
find other sources of funding easily by
reducing the need for bank loans (Hussain et al., 2006).

Consumer finance and corporate finance are different fields but in the
case of studying SME finance, we can
‘borrow’ the ideas and results from the
studies on consumer finance to apply
to the explanation of SME debt financing decisions. This is because the SME
sector has some unique characteristics.
First, it is extremely complicated to
differentiate the financial situation of
the firm from that of its owners. For
instance, the entrepreneur can use the
firm cars and home accommodations
for both private and business purposes. Furthermore, different from large
firms, the decision-making process,
financing decision included, is mostly
in the hands of SME owners or managers. With large enterprises, especially
with joint-stock listed companies,
the decision-making process is much
more complicated and is often affected
or ruled over by other members in the
company’s board of directors. In other
words, business and financing decision with SMEs is often personally
managed. Therefore, SME owners’
knowledge, psychology and attitudes
can have an effect on the company’s
financing decision. Second, the relationships between the small firm and
its stakeholders tend to reflect the
owner’s personal relationships much

In addition, the evolution of behavior
finance theories is suggestive of the
studies on determinants of consumer
borrowing and corporate borrowing
decisions. For instance, behavioral
corporate finance literature suggested
that optimism and overconfidence can
considerably affect the investment and
financing decisions made by managers
(Baker et al., 2005; Fairchild, 2005);
or managers that are more risk toler-
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more than in larger firms where such
relationships are formalized. It is expected that large firms carry out standard corporate governance practices
that executives, board of directors and
auditors are assumed to conform to
transparent norms. Third, the interrelationship between SMEs and financial
institutions is looser in comparison
with large firms. In other words, SME
owners often have strong ties with
informal strands, which leads to the
choice of informal credit sources. This
particular feature of SME network or
social capital obviously has an effect
on their credit participation.
Vietnam signifies an exciting case.
In fact, the country ranks 40th out
of 183 countries in terms of getting
credit in 2012 (World Bank, 2012).
This is a relatively good outcome
of the banking system. Commercial
banks, including state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and private
banks, compete with each other to increase the credit market share and are
beginning to recognize the SME sector as a prospective market and sketch
out strategies to approach this sector.
However, capital shortage is still a big
hindrance to the SME community. The
large majority of SMEs in Vietnam are
very small indeed, and are largely dependent on purely internal and/or
informal sources of financing. This
is true in many developing and transitional economies. As the more successful SMEs grow, they are likely to
need – and get improved access to –
more formal and external sources of
financing.
In Vietnam, according to a recent research executed by Vietnam Chamber
of Commerce and Industry (VCCI),
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75% SMEs would like to access bank
loans but only about 30% of them succeeded (VCCI, 2010). Another survey
conducted by the Central Institutions
of Economic Management (CIEM),
only 30% of SMEs were able to obtain bank loans. The CIEM report in
2012 also confirmed that “constraints
in credit markets have for a long time
been cited (by firms) as the most serious obstacles for future growth of
SMEs in Vietnam” (CIEM, 2012).
SMEs mainly contact commercial
banks to obtain necessary funds. Additionally, twice as many firms obtain
informal loans as compared to formal
ones. Although informal loans only
finance 8 to 9 percent of total investments for SMEs, almost 90% of the
constrained group (in formal credit
markets) has access to loans from informal sources. This shows that informal loans are small but a frequent part
of the Vietnamese SMEs financing
scheme. In addition, the CIEM survey
also revealed that more than 57% of
SMEs do not want to go into debt in
the future, especially getting loan from
banks.
This study proposes a new approach to
investigate the latent factors affecting
the credit participation among SMEs
with respect to behavioral finance and
social capital theories. In addition,
the study also examines the effect of
behavioral finance and social capital
factors on the credit source selection
among SMEs. Through new approaches on SMEs debt financing, the study
aims to answer the questions: Why do
many SMEs not want to participate in
the credit market? And what motivates
SMEs to select informal credit sources
to finance their operations?
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Figure 1. Debt Financing Decision Flow Chart
The study makes the distinction between credit participation and credit
source selection. These terms contribute to a fully-constituted process
of the debt financing decision (Figure
1). When making decisions regarding
the firm’s capital structure, at the first
stage, the SME owner has to decide
whether or not to use debt in the firm
capital structure (credit participation).
Then, if the owner decides to go with
debt or participate in the credit markets, he or she must select the credit
source (or the credit pattern), meaning that they will go with formal credit
sources, semi-formal credit programs
or informal credit sources (credit
source selection).
The remainder of the paper is organized into three sections: The next section we provide a review of behavioral
finance factors as well as social capital
theory and their impact on borrowing
issues. The following section describes
the research methodology of the study.
Findings and discussion are presented
in the fourth section. Finally, section
five concludes with a summary.
Literature Review
None of traditional capital structure
theories and empirical researches

could fully explain the motivations
behind credit participation of the
firms, especially in respect of “debtaverse” firms. Nonetheless, behavioral finance theories and social capital
theory strongly argue that the degree
of present-biased preference, risk attitude, debt attitude, overconfidence of
business managers and social capital
can significantly influence their debt/
equity selection. Hence, as this study
proposes, these factors should be considered as the potential determinant of
credit participation decision by SMEs.
Present Biased Preference or
Hyperbolic Discounting
There is an assumption among economists that people are “time-consistent”,
meaning that “a person’s relative preference for well-being at an earlier date
over a later date is the same no matter
when she is asked” (O’Donoghue and
Rabin, 2000). However, people are
not always patient, conversely, they
often prefer to enjoy rewards soon
but suspend costs until later (Kinari
et al., 2009). Such inclining is called
present-biased preferences. The degree of time discounting is critical in
making finance decisions such as saving, borrowing and investment decisions. Regarding the association be-
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tween present-biased preference and
credit behaviors, based on experimental evidences, several studies indicated
that individuals with higher level of
present-biased time preferences have
propensities to use more debts (Meier
and Sprenger, 2007; Laibson, 2007).
The massive and increasingly use of
credit card debt has been recently explained by present-biased preference
literature. Meier and Sprenger (2007)
explain that since credit cards can offer an instant borrowing, they enable
present-biased individuals the opportunity to “easily and instantaneously
move consumption from the future,
where its value is relatively low, to
the present, where its value is disproportionately high”. Recently, Ikeda
and Myong (2011) conducted a nationwide internet survey of Japanese
adults to examine how debt behavior
is related to personal time discounting. They came to an conclusion that
“impatience are associated with high
debt-to-income ratios, borrowing on
credit cards, and the experiences of
having borrowed unsecured consumer
loans, of having engaged in debt-restructuring”. Besides, present-biased
preference has been also considered as
an commitment device to interpret the
success of microcredit programs and
informal rotating savings and credit
associations in developing countries
(Bauer et al., 2012)
For small business owners, in such a
similar way as credit card using of consumers, they can easily get loans from
a line of credit or a business revolving
account offered by banks or instantaneously obtain debts from moneylenders who do not have strict requirement
of collaterals and complicated application process. They can move business
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or investment opportunities from the
future to the present, where their value
is considered higher than in the future,
according to the time preference perspective. Therefore, in this study, we
expect credit participation and credit
choice of SMEs will be influenced by
the owners’ time preference.
Risk Aversion
There is a considerable difference
among individuals about how they
deal with risks and incertitude. Some
studies showed that attitude toward
risk was accompanied with individually imperative decisions and features
(Dohmen et al., 2005; Brown et al.,
2013). Debt financing is always associated with risks such as risks of bankruptcy, risk of losing collateral, risk of
fluctuating interest rate. Therefore, attitude toward risk is expected to have
an impact on debt holdings of individuals. Fore example, Brown et al. (2013)
in their empirical study explored that
risk aversion and household debt in
the U.S varied in opposing directions,
meaning that people with higher level
of risk aversion have a tendency to employ less debt. Daly et al. (2010) also
used “Risk attitudes as an independent predictor of debt”. They concluded
that “Risk willingness is a robust predictor of debt holdings even controlling for demographics, personality,
consideration of future consequences
and other covariate”. Hence, in our
study, the risk attitude is expected to
have effect on credit choice and credit
participation of SMEs.
Debt Attitudes
In the financial psychology literature,
attitude toward debt or debt aversion is
concerned as one of the determinants
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of credit behaviors. For instance, Livingstone and Lunt (1992) argued that
the debt attitude was strongly associated with the extent of debt that people carry. Lea et al. (1995) reported
that personally psychological attitude
affect credit use, money management
and economic socialization. Davies
and Lea (1995), in their empirical
studies on student debts, explored that
“Students were found to be a relatively
low-income, high-debt group with relatively tolerant attitudes toward debt”.
Consequently, previously empirical
studies suggested that debt attitudes
could be used as a potential factor influencing the credit participation of
SMEs.
Overconfidence
In corporate behavioral finance literature, among cognitive biases which
are predicted to influence financing
and management decisions, overconfidence appears to be the most highly
cited factor determining financing
decisions of the company. Overconfidence generally denotes an exaggeratedly optimistic estimation of one’s
capability over a circumstance. It is
widely believed that entrepreneurs are
susceptibly overconfident (Hackbarth
2008). With respect to the relationship
between overconfidence and company debt/equity selection, a numerous
studies have come to a similar conclusion that managerial overconfidence
will lead to the higher use of leverage
(Hackbarth, 2008; Oliver, 2005; Na
Dai, 2010; Yu et al., 2006). There are
some reasons contributing to the overconfidence-high debt use correlation.
First, the over-optimistic manager often underestimates the probability of
the company going through financial
distress in the future. Therefore, he will

Nguyen and Otake

make light of the expected bankruptcy cost and use more debt to receive
benefits from tax shield (Hackbarth,
2008). Second, overconfident managers often overvalue the upcoming projects, thus prefer to employ debt rather
than issue new equity in order to avoid
sharing the profits of the projects (Yu
et al., 2006).
According to Na Dai (2010), overconfidence could have a critical influence
on financing decisions of small businesses much more than on big companies because “mechanisms that might
constrain less-than-fully-rational managers of a big corporation into making
rational decisions might not be available in small firms”. For instance, big
corporations are often committed to
sound corporate governance systems
such as boards of directors with independence and separation of duties,
proxy fights, and transparent compensation; meanwhile small enterprises
almost do not have such monitoring
mechanisms. Therefore, measuring
overconfident bias and putting it as
expected variable in our model to predict the credit participation and credit
source selection of Vietnam SMEs is
necessary.
Social capital
The literature on social capital suggested that borrowers, especially small
businesses who hardly meet the lenders’ requirement of collaterals and
have poor information record, could
resort to use social capital to improve
their credit accessibility. Social capital
factors also help to explain the widespread existence of informal finance
in developing countries like Vietnam.
First, because there is no legal contract
enforcement mechanisms in informal
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credit market, informal financial institutions have no choice but depend
more on the quantity and quality of
their social connections than formal
providers. Hence, social capital capacitates access to concealed information unavailable to credit markets,
supervise members’ behavior and penalize individual members who stand
against the social standards or rules
(Boot 2000). Second, Southeast Asian
developing countries hold a collectivist instead of an individualist culture
(McGrath et al. 1992). Consequently,
individuals are basically social or relational beings than they are in Western
society. This characteristic of the culture is also included in business contexts, meaning that managers always
make effort to “invest” in building and
maintaining business relationship to
get success in business transactions,
credit transactions included. Biggs and
Shah (2006) argued that the operating
environments in developing countries
are plagued by corruption, lack of
human and material resources, poor
management, and inefficient judicial
systems. As a result, entrepreneurs
must lean on social capital and incorporate themselves in multi-level social
networks.
In discussions of the relationship between social capital and credit access,
scholars often considered and measured networks between a firm and its
stakeholders to concretize its social
capital (Le and Nguyen, 2009). In this
research, as suggested in the previous
literature we conceive social capital
as the intangible assets intrinsic in
business networks which may consist of directors at other enterprises,
bank officers, and government officials (Peng and Luo, 2000). Research-

110

ers asserted that networks enable to
improve a firms’ legitimacy and then
enhance the access to external finance
(Le and Nguyen, 2009; Talavera et al.,
2012). Concretely, as found in a number of previous researches, networking with government officials assists
procedures with authorities and banks
smoothly and quickly. Influential networks with government officials might
have a substantial influence on the enterprise performance and help increase
the creditworthiness when working
with banks (Peng and Luo, 2000).
Similarly, good relationships with
managers at other companies might
improve the inter-firm loans accessibility, trade credit and help to ease the
business contract writing procedures.
Well-established relationships with
bank loan officers increase the firm
opportunities to access bank loans and
good relationships with informal lenders may enhance the likelihood to get
loans from informal financial institutions (Duy, 2012). Further researches
on the role of networking on the access to debt finance by SMEs can be
found in the researches by Zhang et al.
(2006), Biggs and Sha (2006), Atieno
(2009), Turvey and Kong (2010) and
Khwaja et al. (2011). In sum, the authors found a significant positive association between networking and access to debt.
Correspondingly, we delineated five
groups of business cooperation: (a)
network with business communities,
(b) network with governmental institutes, (c) network with formal loan
officers, (d) network with informal
lenders, and (e) network with credit
information bureaus. Though the two
last networks have not been supported
strongly by previous researches, we
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still include in the analysis as potential
factors because of some reasons. First,
because of the widely use of informal
credit as a supplementary and/or substitutional credit source which was
shown in surveys on Vietnam SMEs
(CIEM, 2012), we believe that it is a
potential factor to explain the credit
participation of SMEs. Second, credit
information bureaus today play an increasingly important role in credit market in developing countries (Jappelli
and Pagano, 2002). A credit bureau’s
main activity is to collect data from
a variety of sources on enterprises or
individuals, process and consolidate
data into credit profiles, and disseminate credit information reports to lending grantors and supervisory authorities. Credit information bureaus are
intermediary institutions that help to
enhance the transparency of the credit
market and create special collateral
called “reputation collateral,” which
is particularly important to consumer,
microfinance and small business lending (Luoto et al., 2007). However, the
roles of credit bureau follow from the
assumption that borrowers know that
a credit information bureau records
their borrowing and payment activities. Additionally, borrowers have
rights and are advised to request credit
bureaus to check credit information
about themselves regularly to assure
there is no error in their credit records.
Therefore, if borrowers do not recognize the existence of the credit information bureau, its role as a discipline
device will not work and will weaken
other functions of credit bureaus in
the credit market. Moreover, the unawareness may hinder borrowers from
accessing formal credit sources. To
the best of our knowledge, there is no
study considering the role of borrower
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perceptions and attitude on credit information sharing activities, especially
in developing countries. Although network with credit information bureaus
is not a direct relationship, it may be
a hidden variable affecting the credit
accessibility and credit source choice
of the SME community. Instead of
measuring direct network with credit
bureaus, in our study, we will measure
the SME perceptions and attitudes toward credit information bureaus.
Other potential determinants
There have been a number of other
firm-specific determinants of capital
structure in the literature such as firm
age, ownership, industry, firm size,
tangible assets, audited financial statement (Beck et al., 2005; Le and Nguyen, 2009; Le, 2012). Those variables
which mainly related to demographics
of owners or managers characteristics
and firm characteristics will be used in
this research as control variables.
Based on the literature on SME financing from both the demand side and
supply side, the study’s conceptual
model is described in Figure 2.
Research Method
Research Strategy
Quantitative method with survey data
and econometric analysis is mainly
used in our study. For the purpose of
survey design, at the first stage, we
conducted interviews with five Vietnamese small business owners. The
purpose of these interviews was to
help us to better apprehend the Vietnam SME sector background as well
as debt financing issues. This stage
also supports us to investigate the face
validity of the surveys and serve as a
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Figure 2. Conceptual Model of the Study
foundation for the subsequent survey
design. Regarding the respondent selection, we decided to choose Ho Chi
Minh City (HCMC) to conduct the survey. The survey was carried out during June–August 2013. Urban-based
SMEs are selected mainly because
they are located in the most dynamic
cities where formal and informal financial institutions gather with high
density level; therefore, they have a
variety of ways to choose the source
for financing their operations. HCMC
is always the leading city in terms of
the number of business start-ups. In
Southeast region particularly, there
were 39.08% of the total of enterprises located (CIEM 2012). Moreover,
HCMC, the “economic capital” and
the biggest finance centre in Viet Nam,
is the highest populous city where not
only informal and formal firms but
also informal and formal household
businesses and traders converge on.
Banking system revenue of the city
accounts for approximately one-third
of the total national banking system’s
revenue. There are over 50 banks with
hundreds of branches and lots of insurance, leasing and financial companies
in this city.
After obtaining a list of registered
SMEs from The Assistance Center for
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Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
in the South of Vietnam, we use simple random sampling method to select
1,500 firms to deliver the survey. The
target respondents are owners or key
managers of the companies. With the
support of Small and Medium Business Association of HCMC, on one
hand, we sent the survey through postmail; on the other hand, we apply personal approach to obtain high response
rate. Out of 1,500 surveys distributed,
293 questionnaires are collected. After
discarding inappropriate and missing
value, 263 completed questionnaires
are used to analyze.
Questionnaire instrumentation
After conducting a quantitative pilot
study for checking the instrument validity, some minor editorial adaptation
was done to fit the context. The final
instrument for the demand side consisted of three main sections. Section 1
refers to question 1 to 17, asking about
demographic background of firms and
owners such as firm size, firm age, location, firm ownership type, export activities involvement, auditing practice,
industry, fixed asset ratio, the owner’s
gender, age, education and experience
years in the field. Section 2 includes
11 questions, which are sets of experi-
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mental choice questions to identify behavior finance traits of the firm owners. Section 3 comprises one question,
asking about the firm networks. This
section is structured using the fivepoint Likert scale, ranging from “very
little” (1) to “very extensive” (5) (see
Appendix B)
Analytical methods
A number of methods were used to
analyze the collected data. Description methods, crosstabulations and
association tests were applied to analyze the survey data. In addition, we
use the multiple binary logistic regression with two steps: In the first step,
the data was divided into two groups:
ﬁrms that borrowed from either formal
credit institutions or informal credit
channels or both and those that completely did not use debt in their capital
structure. Then stepwise binary logistic regression was used to investigate
if the potential determinants affect the
probability of participating in a certain credit source. In step 2, we selected enterprises that have debt in their
capital structure, we then examined if
the variables of interest affect credit
source selection among SMEs to interpret motivations of SMEs when they
choose bank loan or informal loans as
the main financing source.
Some empirical studies suggested that
binary logit model was superior to
multinominal logit model in predicting
the probability of a considered event.
Binary logistic regression model has
some advantages over multinominal
one: first, smaller misclassification errors helps to improve the accuracy of
forecasting (Bi-Huei, 2012); second,
binary logistic model helps to detect
outliners easily and require the smaller
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sample size than the one of multinominal model (Menard, 2001). Thus, in
our study, multiple binary logistic regression is preferred instead of a single multinominal logistic model.
The Econometric Model
Explanatory variables computed from
the survey are primarily in the categorical form, particularly the information
relating to SME credit behaviors, thus
logistic regression is appropriate to do
quantitative analysis in our study. Furthermore, since dependent variables
have dichotomous values, binary logistic regression is used. The model is
expressed as:
Where:
zi=β0+β1x1+β2x2+...+βkxk

1)
2)

In which:
pi is the probability that a considered
event occurs
x1:xk are the observation of the kth independent variable
β0 : βk are the regression coefficients
that will be estimated
Measures of variables
To examine determinants of SMEs
credit participation, the two following
dependent variables are defined:
CREDITPART: Participation of SMEs
in a credit program, regardless of informal or formal credit source. This is
a dichotomous variable that takes the
value 1 if the SME use debt in their
capital structure or have access to
credit and 0 otherwise
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CRESOURCE: A binary variable that
takes the value 1 if the SME choose
formal credit source (bank loans) as
their main financing source and 0 otherwise.
Explaining variables include the variables measuring behavioral finance
factors, the variables represent social
capital factors and control variables.
PRESENTBIAS: It is a categorical variable measuring the present
biased preference of respondents.
This variable is measured through a
set of experimental choice questions
modified from the study of Bauer et
al. (2012). Respondents were asked
to select between receiving either
a smaller amount earlier in time or
larger amounts with three months delay. We proposed two set of questions
with each set included five questions
that each increased the future amount
while keeping the instant amount unchanged. The first set was offered at
a present time frame and the second
set was aimed at a future time frame.
Based on the selection of respondents,
we divided the population of respondents into four groups: time consistency
(current and future discount rate are
equal), weakly present biased (Slightly
more patient over future tradeoffs than
current tradeoffs), strongly present biased (Strongly more patient over future tradeoffs than current tradeoffs),
and patient now-impatient later (Less
patient over future tradeoffs than current tradeoffs)
RISKATTI: This is an ordinal variable
measuring risk attitude or risk aversion
of SME owners/managers. Following previous empirical studies on the
relationship between debt (household
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debt, credit card usage, microfinance)
and attitude toward risk, we designed
a set of six hypothetical questions
to quantify risk aversion (Daly et al.
2010, Dohmen et al. 2009). The responses to this question set are then
used to create a six point risk attitudes
index for the SME owners/managers
DEBTATTI: is a ratio scale variable
measuring the attitude toward debt
of the SME owners/managers. Construction of debt attitude scale questions was adapted from the studies by
Davies and Lea (1995). In our study,
debt attitude was estimated through
a series of five Likert-scale questions
regarding two facets: general perception of debt aversion and benefit/cost
tradeoff of debt financing (Cronbach’s
alpha = .82). Principle component
analysis was used to calculate the debt
attitude index. Factor score was used
as a Non-standardized Index (NSI) to
measure overall attitude to credit information sharing activities. The value
of the index can be positive or negative and therefore, making it difficult
to explain. Thus, a standard index (SI)
was developed by Min-Max method:
3)
OVERCONFI: There is no consistency
in measure managerial overconfidence
in previous empirical studies. Park
and Kim (2009) used the average of
twelve months Business Survey Index
as proxy measure of overconfidence.
Oliver (2005) utilized Consumer Sentiment Index by University of Michigan to measure overconfidence of the
U.S. firm managers. In this study, we
followed Na Dai and Ivanow (2010) to
measure overconfidence in financing
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Table 1. Dependent and Independent Variables
Code
Description of Variables
Dependent Variables
CREDITPART Credit participation of SMEs
CRESOURCE

Selection of the main credit source

 Type of Variables
1-Use debt,
0-otherwise
1-formal credit source,
0-otherwise

Independent Variables
PRESENTBIAS Present biased preference of respondents
RISKATTI
Risk attitude or risk aversion of respondents
DEBTATTI
Attitude toward debt of the SME owners/managers
OVERCONFI
Overconfidence of SME owners/managers

Categorical variable
Ordinal variable
Ratio scale variable
1-Overconfidence,
0-otherwise
NETOFFICIAL Networking with officials
Ratio scale variable
NETBUSINESS Networking with business community
Ratio scale variable
NETFORMAL Networking with formal credit sources
Ratio scale variable
NETINFORM
Networking with informal credit grantors
Ratio scale variable
CICAWARE
General perceptions of respondents about credit information bureau
1-Aware, 0-otherwise
CISATTI
Attitude of SMEs toward general credit information sharing activities Ratio scale variable
GENDER
Gender of respondents
1-Male, 0-otherwise
EDUCAT
Education levels of respondents
Categorical variable
EXPERI
Experience of respondents
Ratio scale variable
AGEOWNER
Age of the respondents, measured in years
Ratio scale variable
FIRMAGE
Age of the firm, measured in number of years
Ratio scale variable
AUDIT
Whether the firm has audited financial statements
1-has audited reports,
0-otherwise
EXPORT
Involving in export activities
1-export, 0-otherwise
FIRMSIZE
Size of firm
Categorical variable
FIXASSET
Fixed Asset Ratio of the firm
Ordinal variable
INDUSTRY
Industry the firm operating in
Categorical variable
OWNSHIP
Ownership of the firm
Categorical variable

decisions. They measured the overconfidence as the difference between
the feasible probability that the firm
application for loans will be refused
given the firm characteristics as well
as credit conditions and the firm owners/managers’ subjective evaluation of
this likelihood.
NETWORK Measurement: We followed Peng and Luo (2000) to measure firm networks. Networking factors
are mainly measured through 5-point
scale questions, of which six questions were adapted from Peng and Luo
(2000), three questions were applied
from Le and Nguyen (2009) and three
were newly designed (Cronbach’s alpha = .72). We also followed Peng and
Luo (2000) in using average method

to create a composite measure of the
networks of SMEs with officials, business communities, formal credit grantors and informal credit grantors.
CICAWARE: General perceptions of
respondents about credit information
bureau, specifically the role and functions of Vietnam credit information
center. The True/False questions used
to estimate the perception of SMEs
are modified from Dunkelberg et al.
(1998).
CIATTITUDE: Five-point Likert scale
questions were newly developed to
measure attitude of SMEs toward general credit information sharing activities (Cronbach’s alpha = .82). Similar
to debt attitude calculation, explora-
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Table 2. Credit Participation and Explanatory Variables
PresentBiasedb
PresentBiased(1)
PresentBiased(2)
PresentBiased(3)
RiskAttitude
DAIndex
Network_formlend
Network_inform
Network_business
CISAttitude
OverConf
Constant
Observations
-2 Log Likelihood
R-Squaredc

B
1.821
4.291
1.140
-0.526
0.094
1.482
-1.316
1.887
0.056
2.072
-13.180

S.E.
0.704
1.380
0.737
0.251
0.019
0.407
0.594
0.637
0.018
0.772
2.827

0.586 (Cox & Snell)

Wald
12.073
6.684
9.661
2.395
4.375
24.562
13.275
4.902
8.779
9.313
7.202
21.73

263
95.838

df
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Sig.
0.007
0.010
0.002
0.122
0.036
0.000
0.000
0.027
0.003
0.002
0.007
0.000

Exp(B)
6.176
73.014
3.128
0.591
1.098
4.401
0.268
6.602
1.058
7.944
0.000

0.803 (Nagelkerke)

Note:
a. Variables tested to enter: PRESENTBIAS, RISKATTI, DEBTATTI, OVERCONFI, NETOFFICIAL,
NETBUSINESS, NETFORMAL, NETINFORM, CICAWARE, CISATTI, AUDIT
b. Categorical Variable Codings: Reference Category - Time consistency; Present biased (1) - Weakly present
biased; Present biased (2) - Strongly present-biased; Present biased (3) - Patient now, impatient later
c. R-square estimated at Step 8 (the final step)

tory factor analysis was used to compute factor scores on these items and
create and standardize one variable by
Min-Max Method that reflected credit
information sharing attitude.

uses debt in their capital structure,
(comprising any type of borrowing,
regardless of whether the debt come
from formal or informal sources) and
0 otherwise.

The summarized descriptions of dependent and independent variables are
given in the Table 1.

From the estimation results, present
biased preference, risk aversion, debt
attitude, overconfidence, network with
formal lenders, network with informal
lenders, network with business communities and attitude toward credit information sharing have impacts on the
credit participation of surveyed SMEs
at a statistically significant level. More
specifically, enterprises with impatient
(weakly or strongly-present-biased)
owners/managers are more likely to
employ debt to run business rather than
patient firm owners (other things being
equal). Of time preference types, the
strongly-present-biased group show a
significantly different need of borrowing from “time-consistent” group. The
respective probabilities of firms deciding to use leverage are 6 and 73 times
higher than that of “patient” firms.

Result and Discussion
Model for Credit Participation
In the step 1, we used forward stepwise
logistic regression to explore if the explanatory variables affect the probability of SMEs credit participation. The
independent variables included in the
model comprise those were shown to
have associations with the credit participation according to parametric and/
or non-parametric tests results. Table
2 summarizes the logistic regression
results at the last step.
In the model for credit participation,
the dependent variable is dichotomous, taking the value of 1 if the firm
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With respect to risk aversion, for each
unit increase in “risk aversion”, firms
were 46% less likely to employ debt in
their capital structure. It could be said
that higher risk-tolerant firms (also
meaning lower risk aversion) are often
motivated to involve in risky investment or business expanding opportunities and therefore, they have higher
need of borrowing.
In the case of debt attitude index, the
estimated results indicate that firms
with positive attitude toward debt are
more likely to participate in the credit
market with the probability larger by
1.16 times per additional unit of debt
attitude index. From the cross-sectional analysis, the proportion of enterprises using leverage has higher score
of debt attitude than that of non-debt
using enterprises.
The positively estimated coefficient
for overconfidence factor depict that
overconfident respondents are more
likely to use debt in the capital structure. In other words, the likelihood of a
company with an overconfident owner/manager is 25 times higher than that
of a company with a non-confident
owner/manager.
Regarding social capital factors or in
this case, firm networks, estimation
results show that efforts to build and
maintain good relationships or networking with business communities
(sellers, buyers, competitors, business
association members) and formal lenders motivate and help firms to access
credit, no matter what source of credit
comes from. The respective probabilities of enterprises with highly intense
degree of networking with business
communities and formal lenders par-
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ticipating in the credit market are 7
and 8 times higher than that of enterprise with looser degree of similar
networks. Interestingly, the negative
estimated coefficients for network
with informal lenders suggest that
firms are less likely to employ debt if
they have more intense relationship
with informal lenders (which include
moneylenders, friends and relatives,
members at social clubs). This could
be explained by the argument that intense networks with potential informal
lenders could motivate firms be out of
formal credit market and make use of
their relationships to have non-interest
debt from relatives and friends.
Last, estimated coefficient of CISATTI
show that attitude toward credit information sharing activities has a small
impact on the decision of credit participation. Firms with higher positive attitude are more likely to participate in
the credit market than firms with lower
attitude, with the probability higher by
only 1.07 times per additional unit of
attitude score. The result also show
that network with officials, audited
financial reports, CIC Awareness and
other control variables are insignificant determinants of SMEs credit participation.
Model for Credit Source Selection
In step 2, we selected only enterprises
that had debt in their capital structure.
We then performed binary logistic
regression with forward stepwise selection of variables to investigate the
impact of potential factors on credit source selection decision among
SMEs. The table 3 reports the result of
the regression analysis with dependent variable selection of credit source
at the last step. The variable takes the
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Table 3. Credit Source Selection and Explanatory Variables
PresentBiasedb
PresentBiased(1)
PresentBiased(2)
PresentBiased(3)
RiskAttitude
Network_Officials
Network_formlend
Network_inform
FirmSizec
FirmSize(1)
FirmSize(2)
Constant
Observations
-2 Log Likelihood
R-Squaredd

B

S.E.

0.169
-2.161
0.267
0.924
1.184
1.234
-4.012

0.693
0.912
0.879
0.266
0.481
0.442
0.766

2.367
2.365
1.86

0.763
0.909
1.841

Wald
9.323
0.059
5.614
0.092
12.088
6.069
7.803
27.415
10.155
9.637
6.768
1.020

df
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1

Sig.
0.025
0.807
0.018
0.761
0.001
0.014
0.005
0.002
0.006
0.002
0.009
0.312

Exp(B)
1.184
0.115
1.306
2.520
3.269
3.434
0.018
10.667
10.643
6.422

180
97.089
0.5635 (Cox & Snell)

0.7559 (Nagelkerke)

Note:
a. Variable(s) tested to enter: GENDER, AGEOWNER, FIRMAGE, INDUSTRY, FIRMSIZE, EXPORT, AUDIT,
PRESENTBIAS, RISKATTI, OVERCONFI, NETOFFICIAL, NETFORMAL, NETINFORM, CICAWARE
b. Categorical Variable Codings: Reference Category - Time consistency; Present biased (1) - Weakly present
biased; Present biased (2) - Strongly present-biased; Present biased (3) - Patient now, impatient later.
c. Categorical Variable Codings: Reference Category – Micro enterprises; Firmsize (1) – Small Enterprises;
Firmsize (2) – Medium enterprises
d. R-square estimated at Step 6 (the final step)

value of 1 if the firm choose formal
credit source such as bank loan as their
main external financing source and
0 otherwise. Independent variables
which showed a relationship with dependent variables in association tests
were included in the model.
The results indicate that Present biased
preference, Risk attitude, network with
officials, network with formal lenders,
network with informal lenders, and
firm size are statistically significant
determinants of the credit source selection.
Among present-biased preference subcategories, only strongly-present biased group demonstrates the inverse
relationship with credit source selection at the 5% level of significant. The
value of Exp(B) for strongly-present
biased was .115 which implies a decrease in the odds of 88.5%. That is to
say, strongly-present biased firm owners/managers are 88.5% less likely to
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carry large debt from formal credit
suppliers than the rest (if other factors
are equal). Instead, they have a tendency to employ more debt from informal sources.
Strong evidence of the impact of risk
aversion factor on credit source selection was also found. At the 99%
confidence interval, the higher risk
aversion level the firms have, the
more likely they are to go with formal
credit source as their main financing
source. For each unit increase in “risk
aversion”, the probability of selecting formal credit sources is 2.5 times
higher. The most likely explanation
of this result is the difference in risk
between credit formal and informal
sources. Informal credit sources have
their own advantages such as flexible
arrangements, not strict requirement
of collaterals, low transaction costs
but they are also expensive and unreliable sources. This contrasts with
the formal lender providers, who offer
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relatively low interest rates, but often
enforce complicated and time-consuming procedures on borrowers that
boost their transaction costs. Informal
credit sources are believed that their
inherent risks are always higher than
that of formal credit sources like bank
loans. Borrowing from informal credit
sources, especially from moneylenders is able to increase the risk of bankruptcy for enterprises. Therefore, it is
reasonable that if an entrepreneur has
a high tolerant level of risk he/she is
more willing to choose informal credit
to finance their business.
With regards to firm networking, estimation results illustrate that intense
networks with officials and formal
lenders could enhance the probability
of formal credit access; consequently,
firms with high score of such networks
have trends to go with formal credit
source as their important financing
source. In detail, for each unit increase
in network score with officials and
formal lenders, survey SMEs were approximately 3.2 and 3.4 times more
likely to select formal credit source,
respectively. On the contrary, for each
unit increase in “network with informal lenders”, respondents were about
98% less likely to go with formal credit source. To put it another way, highly
intense network with informal credit
providers increase the probability of
firms to select informal sources.
Finally, positive coefficients of firm
size sub-categories show that the firm
size factor play a role in explaining
the firm credit source selection. Specifically, the firms that belongs to the
small-size group and medium-size
group were approximately 2.4 and 1.8
times respectively more likely to se-
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lect formal credit sources compared to
micro-size enterprises.
The regression analysis also show that
at the 5% significant level, independent
variables such as Owner Gender, Age,
Firm Age, Industry, Export, Audited
Financial reports, overconfidence and
CIC awareness did not play a role in
predicting the credit source selection.
The reason may be due to the correlation among independent variables and
numeric problems when estimating the
model.
Discussion
Our results generally support the hypothesis that firms financing decisions
are significantly affected by behavior
finance factors and firm social capital.
We found that personal traits of firms
owners/managers such as presentbiased preference, debt attitude, risk
aversion and overconfidence could
play important roles in explaining the
decision of debt using as well as credit
source selection for small enterprises.
In addition, the results also suggested
that social capital, which was represented and measured through firms
networking, have effects on SMEs
credit participation and credit source
selection. Besides, firm attitude toward
credit information sharing, a factor
more or less reflect the firm creditworthiness and efforts to be transparent in
the eyes of credit grantors, and firm
size also contributed in explaining the
SMEs financing decisions.
There are several imperative contributions which our research made to the
literature of business management. At
the first place, the research is one of
the few studies that consider the influence of behavioral finance factors on
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firms financing decision. Especially,
from the perspective of behavioral
finance and social capital, our study
helps to investigate the latent motivations to explain the reason why there is
a significant proportion of firms with
completely non-debt using and why
informal loans still play important
role in the financing of SMEs. Second,
while the role of social capital is mentioned as an important determinant
in enhancing firm performance and
finance accessibility worldwide, the
study highlight its role in constructing legitimacy for small enterprises
in developing markets. In Vietnam,
informal data seems to be the basis
of the bank loan officers’ estimation
of enterprise creditworthiness. Public
information, if it is available, helps to
provide supplementary data that can
support the application packages legally acceptable (Nguyen, 2005). The
study proved the importance of informal networks, which is consistent with
this argument. Our study indicated that
network with informal/ formal lenders
even affect the SMEs decision of credit source selection.
Though we did not find strong evidences of the role of awareness and
attitude toward credit information
sharing practices on SMEs financing decisions, it is undeniable about
the role of credit information bureaus
in enhancing credit accessibility for
firms, which have been confirmed by
many empirical studies. The role of
credit information bureaus and “reputation collateral” is only promoted in
an information-based lending system. Yet, there is still a long way for
a transition market like Vietnam to
transform from a collateral-based and
relationship-based lending system to
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an information-based one. In the context of lending transactions conducted
based on relationship and/or collateral,
small businesses and individuals may
not pay a serious attention to credit
information bureau and may not try
the best to keep good records on their
credit history profile. In addition, the
database of Vietnam credit information center is still limited with credit
information data collected from financial institutions in the market. As
a consequent, Vietnam CIC does not
have sufficient information to give
a well-founded estimation about potential borrowers’ creditworthiness. It
also means that the only public credit bureau in Vietnam is not powerful
enough to make borrowers cautious
in their payment practices as well as
help credit institutions to make precise
lending decisions based on CIC credit
reports.
Managerial Implications
Our data suggest that social capital
is critical to SMEs credit participation and credit source selection. Once
market institutions and infrastructures
in developing country like Vietnam is
incomplete with high level of information asymmetry problems, social and
business networks will play important
roles in helping SMEs to ease business procedures and transactions, borrowing included. This suggests that it
is necessary to provide education and
training programs for SMEs owners
to develop their networks effectively,
in addition to conventional practices
such as well-prepared business plans
and financial statements, audit execution and reporting. Moreover, bank
loan officers should be prepared to
work with private businesses under
uncertainty and trained to collect and
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verify valuable information through
formal and informal networks.
Besides, building network with credit
information bureau through keeping
good credit records, updating credit
reports with the bureau annually is
also important for enterprises to access formal credit sources easily. The
system cannot be fully work-out, nonperforming loans cannot be reduced if
borrowers do not pay attention to the
existence and role of credit information system. Credit information bureaus and credit institutions should
coordinate to diffuse knowledge about
the role of credit information practices
to borrowers and potential customers.
This can be done by carrying out financial education for customers through
media channels or directly improving
customers’ awareness when they come
to banks.
The finding on the impact of behavioral finance factors has implications
for banks to consider creating lending
products which is suitable for personal
traits of SMEs owners. Formal credit
institutions can learn about lending
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policies and practices from informal
credit providers. Micro-finance studies
indicated that group lending services
or lending forms of rotating savings
and credit association attract individuals with present-biased preference.
Formal credit institutions could learn
and create more creative credit line
products like that case of informal finance.
Conclusion
The large proportion of SMEs badly
needs external financial resources for
growth but there are still many enterprises who “avoid” debt in their capital structure. This study is an attempt
to investigate the motivation behind
the decision to participate in the credit
market of SMEs from perspectives of
behavioral finance and social capital
theory. Furthermore, we found that
personal traits of SMEs owners/managers in terms of behavioral finance
factors and firms networking also have
impacts on the firms’ credit source
selection. Our results contribute to
explain the common use of informal
credit market in developing countries.

Atieno, R. (2009), Linkages, Access to Finance and the Performance of Smallscale Enterprises in Kenya. Journal of Accounting and Business Research,
3(1), 33-48.
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Section A:

Research Questionnaire for SME owners/managers

Appendix

1. Position:

�a. Owner

�b. Manager �c. Other

2. Sex:		

�a. Male

�b. Female			

3. Age: ……….
4. The entrepreneur’s Name: ………………………………………….
5. The year of establishment: …………………………………………...
6. Ownership:
�a Household Business
�e Joint-stock company with partly state ownership
�b Private enterprise
�f Joint-stock company with no state ownership
�c Cooperative
�g Joint-venture company with foreign capital
�d Limited liability company �h State-owned enterprise
7. Industry/Business Field:
�a. Industrials & Construction (Industrials, Basic materials, construction, Real
estate)
�b. Consumer Goods (Food &Beverage, Personal & Household Goods)
�c. Consumer Services (Retail, Healthcare included)
�d. Telecommunication & Technology
8.	The number of experience years you have been working in this industry/
field (even before establishing this entrepreneur): ………….. years
9. Educational level:
�a. Primary/Secondary
�b. High school		

�c. College/University
�d. Master or higher

10. Owner’s average income per month:
�a. < 20 million VND
�c. 51-100m VND
�b.21-50m VND
�d.101- 150m VND

�e.> 151m VND
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11. Does the entrepreneur participate in export activities? �Yes �No
12. Total assets of your business:
�a.<1billion Vnd �b.1-10b Vnd

�c.11-50b Vnd

�d.50-100b Vnd

13. Fixed assets as a percentage of total assets in your business:
�a.0%-10%
�b.11%-30%
�c.31%-50%
�d.51-70%
14. Bank loans as a percentage of total assets in your business:
�a. No bank loan �b. <10% �c.11%-30% �d.31%-50% �e.>50%
15.	Informal loans (borrowing from relatives, friends, moneylenders) as a percentage of total assets:
�a. No informal loans �b.<10% �c.11%-30% �d.31%-50% �e.>50%
16. In the past two years, has your firm ever been turn downed by banks?
�a. No borrowing from banks
�b. Banks accepted short-term (or long-term) loans but declined long-term loans
(or short-term)
�c. Banks declined both short-term and long-term loans
�d. Banks always accepted
17. (For firms which use debt in capital structure) In your opinion, which
credit source is more important to your business?
�a. Formal credit sources such as banks
�b. Informal credit sources such as relatives, friends, partners, moneylenders
Section B:
Q1. Given your present circumstances, suppose you won a tax-free prize at a local bank and were offered a choice between two prizes. Please choose one
among each pair of prizes as follows:
Option A
Getting money today
(1) �A. Getting 1000$ today
(2) �A. Getting 1000$ today
(3) �A. Getting 1000$ today
(4) �A. Getting 1000$ today
(5) �A. Getting 1000$ today

Or
Or
Or
Or
Or
Or

Option B
Getting money three months later
�B. Getting 1050$ three months later
�B. Getting 1100$ three months later
�B. Getting 1200$ three months later
�B. Getting 1300$ three months later
�B. Getting 1400$ three months later

Q2. By the same token, among each pair choices of prize, please choose one you
prefer.

Option A
Getting money a year later
(1) �A. Getting 1000$ a year later
(2) �A. Getting 1000$ a year later
(3) �A. Getting 1000$ a year later
(4) �A. Getting 1000$ a year later
(5) �A. Getting 1000$ a year later

Or
Or
Or
Or
Or
Or

Option B
Getting money a year and three months later
�B. Getting 1050$ a year and three months later
�B. Getting 1100$ a year and three months later
�B. Getting 1200$ a year and three months later
�B. Getting 1300$ a year and three months later
�B. Getting 1400$ a year and three months later

Q3. Suppose your business had been running very well and have an ability to
guarantee your income for your family. And this current business was your/
your family’s only source of income. Then you are given the opportunity to

126

Credit Participation and Credit Source Selection...

Nguyen and Otake

take a new and quite good investment with 50-50 chance that it will double
your income. But there is a 50-50 chance that it will cut your income and
spending power by a third. Would you accept this new investment?
�Yes �No
For those who answer “yes” for Q3, please answer Q4; “no” for Q3, please
answer Q5
Q.4	Now, suppose the chances were 50-50 that the new investment would double
your income, and 50-50 chance that it would cut it in half. Would you accept?
�Yes �No
If you answer “yes” to Q4, please answer Q7, “no” for Q4, please answer Q8
Q.5	Now, suppose the chances were 50-50 that the new investment would double
your income (profit), and 50-50 that it would cut it by 20%. Then would you
accept? �Yes �No
For those who answer “yes” to Q5, please answer Q8; “no” to Q5, please answer Q6
Q.6	Now, suppose that the chances were 50-50 that the new investment would
double your profit and 50-50 that it could it by 10%. Then would you accept?
�Yes �No
Q.7 Now, suppose that the chances were 50-50 that the new investment would
double your income, and 50-50 that it would cut it by 75%. Would you still
accept? �Yes �No
Q8. Please indicate by ticking in the appropriate box to what extent you agree/
disagree to the statement about borrowing:
(1)Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not sure; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly Agree
1. Debt is an integral part of doing business because it help firm to
1 2 3 4
extend investment chances and have tax shield.
2.	The entrepreneur should be discouraged from using debts since
interest expense can become a burden causing bankruptcy and the
1 2 3 4
control of the firm will be lost.
3.	The entrepreneur should satisfy with your current situation rather
1 2 3 4
than borrow money to expand your business.
4. It is OK to have a loan if you know you can pay if off.
1 2 3 4
5. Once you are in debt it is very difficult to get out.
1 2 3 4
6. Owing money is basically wrong.
1 2 3 4

5
5
5
5
5
5

Q9. During the last three years, were there times when you needed credit for your
business, but did not apply because you thought the application would be
turned down? �Yes �No
Q10. Please indicate by ticking in the box whether statements about Vietnam
Credit Information Center (CIC) is Right or Wrong:
1. CIC is a government agency that collects and maintains credit
records of firms and individuals.

Right

Wrong

�

�
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2. CIC is a private corporation that collects unpaid bills of firms
and consumers.
3. The main role of CIC is to rate firms and consumers and
determine whether or not they can receive credit
4. Credit history report issued by CIC could affect the accessibility
to credit of the entrepreneur

�

�

�

�

�

�

Q11. Please indicate by ticking in the appropriate box to what extent you agree/
disagree to the statement about CIC:
(1)Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not sure; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly Agree
1.	The lender to whom I apply for loan can check my previous
borrowing information at other financial institutions, especially
1 2 3 4
regarding collateral and late or non-repayment activities
2.	Late repayment or default in the past does not affect the decision of
1 2 3 4
the lender to whom I apply for a loan.
3.	I have always been trying to keep my credit record good to get loans
easily by repaying principle and interest amounts of my personal
1 2 3 4
and firm’s loans on time.
4. When I apply for credit, I am willing to let the loan officer check the
1 2 3 4
information about me and the firm on file with CIC Vietnam
5. The credit information about me and my firm provided by CIC
1 2 3 4
makes the bank trust my creditworthiness

5
5
5
5
5

Q12. Please indicate by ticking in the appropriate box to describe the extent to
which top managers at your firm have utilized personal ties, networks, and
connections during the past three years with
(1)very little

(5)very extensive
1. Network with Top managers at buyer firms
1 2 3 4 5
2. Network with Top managers at supplier firms
1 2 3 4 5
3. Network with Top managers at competitor firms
1 2 3 4 5
4.	Network with Political leaders in various levels of the government 1 2 3 4 5
5. Network with Officials in industrial bureaus
1 2 3 4 5
6. Network with Officials in regulatory and supporting organizations
such as tax bureaus, the state bank, commercial administration
1 2 3 4 5
bureaus, etc.
7.	Network with Members of business associations
1 2 3 4 5
8. Network with Members of social clubs or associations
1 2 3 4 5
9.	Network with Relatives and friends who do not belong to any of
1 2 3 4 5
above categories
10.	Network with Moneylenders (informal)
1 2 3 4 5
11. Network with Loan officers at some commercial banks
1 2 3 4 5
12. Network with Loan officers at People Credit Fund/ Microcredit
1 2 3 4 5
Financial Institutions
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